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ABSTRACT: This paper investigates the influence the decline in the family size on household

size through a Chinese family planning policy, the One-Child Policy (OCP). I find the evidence
of the negative effect at the micro level using Chinese household survey data. I also study the
aggregated effect using Chinese provincial level data. With the concern of endogeneity, I use a
two-stage least square regression with financial punishments for having more than one child and
share of population that were exempted from the restriction as instruments for the fertility
variable. This regression shows a positive impact of the implementation of the OCP on
household saving rate. The empirical result indicates that the decline in the share of population
under 20 can explain 40 percent of the observed increase of the Chinese household saving rate in
the last thirty years.
Keywords: Saving Rate, China, One-Child Policy, Demographics
JEL Classifications: D12, E21
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1. Introduction

The Chinese saving rate has been increasing for years and is currently one of the highest
in the world. It increased from 13.73% in 1981 to 29.84% in 2012. At the same time, population
growth has been slowing down in China. The number of people entering the labor force started
decreasing in 2012. The family planning policies, such as the One-Child Policy, directly leads to
the demographic change. The one-child restriction controlled the fast increase of population
starting from the 1950s. As a result of the OCP, the average number of children in a family
dropped from 3 in the early 1970s to 1 since the early 1980s. The demographic change under the
influence of the OCP reduced the share of youth in the total population. This paper proposes that
the demographic change resulted from the OCP is one of the reasons that led to the current high
household saving rate in China.
Understanding the saving behavior is important due to its influence on the Chinese
economy. Studying this effect is especially essential to Chinese policymakers. Starting from
January 2016, China has officially changed the family planning policy from a One-Child Policy
to a Two-Child Policy (TCP). By studying how the change in family size, resulted from the
OCP, impacts saving rates, this paper can help better understand the possible influence of the
new family planning policy, the TCP. The high saving rate not only supports Chinese domestic
investment, but also has a spillover effect on the global trade balance. The relaxation of the
family planning policy will influence both Chinese domestic economy growth and the global
trade balance through its impact on Chinese household saving rate.
The OCP affects household saving rate in two potential aspects, the expenditure channel
and the transfer channel. On the one hand, having only one child requires less expenditure on
raising children. Part of the reduced consumption goes to saving. Thus, the expenditure channel
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expects that decreasing share of youth leads to a higher saving rate. On the other hand, the
children's financial support to old-age parents is the transfer channel. Parents raise children as an
investment with expected long-term positive financial returns. As a part of the traditional value
of family, children have the responsibility to support their parents financially in the retirement
period. The restriction of the number of children does not only decrease the quantity of the
expected future income but also increases the risk of the transfer payment. With the
consideration of future consumption level, households save more to compensate the reduction of
potential transfer from children. Therefore, based on both the life-cycle theory and permanent
income theory, it is reasonable to expect a negative relationship between the number of children
and the household saving rate. I predict an increase in the saving rate in order to maintain
consumption in the retirement period due to the reduction in the expenditure of rearing children
and decreased expected financial support from the next generation.
This paper conducts two approaches to examine the influence of the OCP on Chinese
household saving behavior. First, with the provincial data from the Chines Statistic Yearbook, I
perform a 2SLS regression to estimate the macro level effect on household saving rate with
regards to the implementation of the OCP, through its direct impact on share of youth. I estimate
the share of population under 20 years old using financial punishment of having more than one
child and share of minority as instruments to avoid the issue of potential endogeneity. These
instruments also indicate the strictness of the OCP. Thus, the 2SLS regression shows the direct
effect of the implementation of the OCP on household saving rate. This estimation predicts that
the OCP limits the share of youth and increases the saving rate. Second, I test this relation at the
micro level using household survey data from the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP). I
find that at household level, the number of children is negatively related to the saving rate. Both

Cao 5

of the results support my hypothesis that the implementation of the OCP led to an increase in the
Chinese household saving rate.

2. Background Information

Since the Chinese economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, China's
economic development burgeoned and has maintained the high level of growth. It has been
argued that investment and net export have been the main factors fueling China's growth.
However, with a challenging global economy, particularly in the western world, the Chinese
government decided to switch the focus to consumption through the expansion of domestic
demand to promote growth. While further economic reforms have been initiated since 2005,
domestic consumption remains low by international standards partly due to the high saving rate. 1
The average provincial level household saving rate in 2012 was 29.84%. This is relatively high
compared to other countries. For example, the private saving rate was 6.6% in the United States
and 3.5% in South Korea in 2012. Chinese high saving rate has been a puzzling economic fact. If
we can explain the high saving rate in China, it would be easier for the Chinese government to
set policies in order to stimulate domestic consumption. The high saving rate in China may be
caused by the government policy itself, the One-Child Policy.
The OCP is a strict family planning policy introduced by the Chinese government in 1978
and had been enacted from 1980 to 2015. China faced an increasing rate of population growth in
the 1960s. With worries based from the Malthusian growth model, the Chinese government
implemented a strict one-child restriction to control the increasing population at 1980. Although
there are exceptions for rural citizens and ethnic minorities, citizens who violate the OCP face
1

Chart 1 in Appendix A shows the trend of average of the household saving rate of 31 provinces in China from
1980 to 2007.
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not only a large amount of economic fines, but also the risk of losing their job from the stateowned enterprises (SOEs) and exclusion from any form of government subsidies. This family
planning policy affected the fertility decision of a wide range of Chinese households and also
influenced their economic behaviors. Although this policy is implemented nationally, each state
government has its own power of the specific rules. As a result, the strictness of the OCP is
different across provinces based from the level of financial and political punishment.
The demographic change by the influence of the OCP can provide an explanation of the
high saving rate through its effect on the share of youth in the total population. The OCP affects
household saving rate in two potential aspects, the expenditure channel and the transfer channel.
The transfer channel is especially prominent within the Chinese culture. Children act as a main
support for aged parents. It is even stipulated by Constitutional law: "children who have come to
age have the duty to support and assist their parents" (Article 49). After·the introduction of the
OCP, the average number of children in a family dropped to 1 from 3 in the early 1970s2 . The
restriction of the number of children in a family caused a decrease in the expected future income
for parents. In addition, considering that parent's income during their retirement period, depends
on the only child~ it increases the risk of potential payment.

3. Related Literature

Many scholars have explored the Chinese saving puzzle. Chamon and Prasad (2010) state
that the precautionary purpose of saving based on the income uncertainty and lack of mature
national social security system is a possible explanation. The undeveloped financial market also
contributes to the high saving rate. Since 2003 the pension system, health care and the financial
2

Chart 2 in Appendix A shows the trend of average of share of population that is under 20 years old for 31
provinces in China from 1980 to 2007.
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system all developed significantly, however, the saving rate did not stop from increasing. The
unique Chinese culture is another common explanation. Risk aversion is a culture norm in China.
However, culture norm is not subject to significant change. This particular cultural-ethical value
cannot explain the recent sudden increase of Chinese household saving rate while historically the
saving rate was as low as 5.3% during 1960s.
In this paper, I will explain the high saving rate in China by the One-Child policy with its
direct impact on demographic change. The link between the fertility and the household saving
rate has caught the attention of many economists. Modigliani and Cao (2004) first propose to
explain the Chinese saving puzzle with the life-cycle hypothesis. They state that the saving rate
should depend on long-term rate of income growth instead of the per-capita income, as in the
standard Keynesian model. Household utility function is derived from the allocation of current
and future consumption. Therefore, explaining the increasing saving rate with the rising income
level is not sound. While increase in income does drive up saving, it cannot explain the sharp
change of share of saving. Modigliani and Cao state that the saving rate is affected by the
demographic structure. Particularly, the reciprocal of dependence ratio (ratio of working to nonworking population) has a strong negative effect on saving ratio. They show that within 20 years
of the implementation of the OCP, the share of people under fifteen years relative to working
population decreased almost by half The rising saving rate matches with the increased share of
working population in the total population, which supports their theory.
In addition to the influence from increased working population ratio, Curtis, Lugauer and
Mark (2015) provide two more channels, expenditure and intergenerational transfer effect, to
explain the saving behavior, similarly to what I propose. They employ an overlapping
generations model (OLG) that includes the children's consumption in parent's utility and
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intergenerational transfer with the consideration of the entire age distribution. Their OLG model
predicts a negative relation between the number of children and the saving rate. The results of
Curtis etc. (2015) is consistent with the micro-level data.
Moreover, Zhang (2014) adds the consideration of the increased risk of expected future
income with only one child to explain the saving rate. After the implementation of OCP, the oldage support of most Chinese households depends solely on one single child. It is riskier
compared to having multiple children, which allows diversification. In Zhang's study, he studies
the effect of fertility on the household saving rate at provincial level with control of income
growth, young and old age dependency ratio, and the interaction between the young-age
dependency ratios with fertility. Contradictory to the predicted negative correlation, Zhang finds
a positive effect of fertility on saving. He explains the unexpected positive influence with the
increase in the investment in human capital and the expenditure of insurance to hedge the
uncertainty.
However, in Zhang's regression, there is potential endogeneity that can lead a biased
estimation. Saving rate can endogenously affect fertility decisions. Taking this issue into
consideration, I perform a 2SLS estimation as a comparison with OLS. Banerjee, Meng, and
Qian (2010) along with Lugauer, Ni and Yin (2015) use instruments for the number of children
in their micro-level study of the impact of the number of children on household saving rate.
Banerjee etc. (2010) estimate the effect of the number of children on household saving rate at a
micro level. They instrument the number of children with a dummy variable for whether the first
child was born during or after 1972, the starting year of the set of family planning policy. In
1972, the Chinese government shifted the demographic policy from pro-fertility to controlling
the population growth. If the first child was born after 1972, the number of children that the
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household could have is limited exogenously by the family planning policy. Except for the
limitation in the number of children, there is no other significant difference before and after
1972. Thus the estimated number of children using the birth period of the first child is not
correlated to other variables that relate to saving rate. However, the strictness of the family
planning policy changes over years and is also different across regions. While this instrument is
still valid, it is worth noting that the result is the estimation of post-reform average effect.
Lugauer etc. (2015) use the county level number of birth to instrument the number of children at
the household level. They claim that OCP, as a natural experiment, has exogenous shock on the
birth rate for each region and affects the fertility choice for each household. But the county level
birth rate is not correlated with the household saving rate, thus it is a valid instrument for a micro
level study. In order to study the effect of fertility on saving at the aggregate level, Wang (2010)
uses share of minority as an instrument for the provincial fertility level. When examining the
aggregated gender effect on Chinese saving behavior, Ebenstein (2008) and Wei and Zhang
(2011) use financial punishment in addition to share of minority as instruments for sex ratio. I
follow their choice of instruments to correct for the endogeneity. However, I use these
instruments for the share of youth in the total population to provide a direct implication of OCP
on saving rate. I will explain the validity of the financial punishment and share of minority as
instruments in the empirical strategy section.
In general, I predict a positive effect of the OCP on saving rate through its direct
influence of the share of young population. However, it is worth noting while partial equilibrium
of the OLG model predicts a strong negative relationship between the number of children and
saving rate, Banerjee, Meng, Porzio and Qian (2013) claim that the general equilibrium effect of
interest rate and wage growth can offset this negative relationship. They argue that if wage and
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price are endogenous, an increase in aggregate fertility drives up labor-capital ratio and leads to
increasing interest rate. With the reduced value of future transfer payment, the aggregate saving
increases. Taking general equilibrium force into account, the transfer channel predicts a positive
relation between fertility and the saving rate.

4. Theoretical Model

I use a life cycle model to show the relation between fertility decision and household
saving decision. This model considers household consumption and saving behavior for two
generations in two periods, working period (w) and retirement period (o). All agents in the same
period are assumed to have identical consumption and saving behaviors. The utility of the agents
first depends on their consumption in working period and in retirement period with a discount
factor,

/3. In addition, the consumption of the dependent children who are younger than 20 years

old also enters utility function of their parents with a utility weight (). The lifetime utility
function of an individual is presented as Equation 1.
(1)

where the number of children, Nk is exogenous.
In the working period, the agents transfer a percentage of income, rYw, to their parents as
old age support. Besides the consumption for their children, the rest of the disposable income
goes to saving, S. In the retirement period, the agent get rYw amount of transfer payment from
each of the children. A household with Nk children will receive NkrYw as the transfer from the
working age children. In addition, the agent also collect the accumulated saving with interest
payment. The agents make consumption and saving decision to maximize utility with subject to
the budget constraints, which are presented as Equation 2 and 3.
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(2)
(3)

where the income in the working and retirement period, Yw and Y0 , interest rate, r, and the transfer
facto, r, are all exogenous.
In this model, the expenditure channel and transfer channel are both present to show how
does the exogenous restriction of fertility affect household saving rate. The NkCk is the
expenditure of the dependent children, which represents the expenditure channel. The NkrYw is the
transfer payment as old-age support from the dependent children. Using the optimal level of
consumption and saving derived from first order condition3 , I first calculate the marginal effect
of the number of children for the total consumption for the agent in the working period, which is
shown in Equation 4. The positive partial derivative indicates that the total level of consumption
decrease as the number of children becomes restricted, thus leads to an increase in the saving
account. This condition is consistent with the expenditure channel. Moreover, in order to check
for the transfer channel, I then calculate the marginal effect of the transfer factor, r, on saving.
The result of this partial derivate is shown as Equation 5. The negative sign indicates that the
amount of saving will increase as the transfer payment decreases, which supports the transfer
channel theory. This model shows that, overall, as the number of children decreases, the amount
of saving will increase. This is shown by the negative partial derivative of the number of children
on saving that is presented as Equation 6. Together, these illustrate the channels I propose in the
empirical analysis.
iJ(Cw+NkCk)
iJNk

3

= (l+P+8Nk)[rYw+8Y +28rYwNk+(l+r)(1-T)8Yw]+8(1+8Nk)[Y +TYwNk+(l+r)(1-T)Yw] > Q
0

Please see the calculation in Appendix B.

0

(l+r)(l+P+8Nk) 2

( )
4
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aso -

a.

(5)

(6)

5. Empirical Strategy

I use a provincial panel dataset of the share of youth in total population and the private
saving rate to see the effect of OCP on household savings behavior. The proposed regression is
as follows:

savingit

=Po+ P1 share of under20it + px1 + Eit

(7)

(-)

p1 measures

the effect of share of youth on saving rate. Vector X is the group of additional

explanatory variables: per capita income and GDP growth at the provincial level, share of labor
force enrolled in social security, fixed year effect and fixed province effect. Even with these
control variables, there will be issues with endogeneity in this OLS model. The fertility decision
can be endogenously decided by the saving choice. Households with high savings can better
afford the financial punishment of violating the one child restriction. Thus, the saving rate can
influence the household's choice on the number of children to raise and then influence the share
of youth positively. Also, the income level of the household can bring multicollinearity concern
because it positively relates to both the share of youth and the saving rate in the society.
In order to avoid the endogeneity, I plan to run a 2SLS regression using the financial
punishment and the minority group as instruments for the share of population under 20.
Although the OCP was effective since 1980, the implementation of financial punishment started
in 1993. If the household is found having more children than their limit, the household must pay
a large amount of fine for each additional child. The amount of fine is a certain percentage of the
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annual income of the household. Although the OCP is a national policy, each state government
enforces it individually. This allows for a variation in the strictness of the implementation, which
could result in distinct ratio of the youth in each province. A local government has the right to
decide the amount of the fine imposed for the violation of the OCP within its province. The fine
amount charged for violating the OCP should influence the share of youth in the region;
however, saving behavior is expected to be independent from the strictness of financial
punishment. The possibility of precautionary saving behavior to pay for the fine to have
additional children is small. The average rate of the fine across province is 1.25 times of the
annual income. The maximum rate is 5 times of the annual income, which was enforced in
Beijing. Due to the large amount of financial punishment, the likelihood of saving for the fine is
small. Moreover, the provinces with heavy amount of fine are those that have strong motive to
control for the population growth. These provinces are also likely to have strict political ·
punishment as well. This further reduces household's motivation of the precautionary saving to
counter the fine. Therefore, the fine acts as a proxy of the enforcement of the OCP and can be
used as an instrument for the share of youth to avoid the endogeneity. Another instrument I am
using is the share of minority. China consists of fifty-six ethnic groups. The Han Chinese is the
majority ethnic group, which accounts for 92% of China's population. The remaining groups are
minorities. The Chinese government set many public policies in favor of the minorities, such as
exclusion from the OCP, to promote a harmonious environment between the Han and the
minorities. If a married couple is of an ethnic minority, the household can be exempted from the
OCP. With the allowance of having two children, increasing minority share in the province has a
positive effect on the share of youth. In most provinces, because of the urbanization, the
minorities have converted to the general Chinese life-style and are well merged with the Han
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community. Moreover, cross ethnic group marriage is common. It is reasonable to expect that
there is no endogenous difference across the pure Han households and the minority ones. Thus,
the share of minorities in the province is a feasible instrument for the share of youth.
The 2SLS estimations can correct for endogeneity. More importantly, since financial
punishment and share of minorities are both directly related to the strictness of the family
planning policy, they allow the examination of the impact of the OCP on the saving rate through
the ratio of youth in total population. Here are two proposed first stage regressions:

share under 20it = a 0 + aif ineit + aXi + Eit

(8)

(-)

share under 20it =Po+ P1 sh. minoritYit + pxi +µit

(9)

(+)

share under 20it =Yo+ y1 fineit + y 2 sh. minoritYit + yXi +€it
(+)

(IO)

(+)

Equation 8 and 9 are the first stages with only fines or share of minority as the instrument for the
share of youth respectfully, while Equation 10 uses both fines and share of minority as
instruments. Using the estimated share of population under 20, the second stage is given in
Equation 11. The coefficient on the estimated share of youth will provide an unbiased estimation
of the effect of the OCP on private saving rate through the change of share of youth.
(11)

6. Data Description

The household saving rate is the percentage point of the private saving of a household's
disposable income. The amount of private saving is calculated by subtracting living expenditure
from disposable income. I collected this data from Chinese Statistical Yearbooks. Provincial
GDP growth rate is also available at Chinese Statistical Yearbooks. Scharping (2003) provides
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data of the financial punishment for unauthorized birth. The fine is defined as a percentage of
household's annual income. In addition, I obtained the data of the share of population less than
20 years old, the share of minorities, the share of population enrolled in social security and log of
per capita income level from Wei and Zhang (2011 ). Table 1 shows the statistical summary of
variables. All of the data are at provincial level ranging from the year 1980 to 2007. It contains
the time period from the beginning of OCP enforcement. There are in total thirty-one provinces
in China. However, Chongqing was under the governance of Sichuan Province before 1996.
Thus there is only data for Chongqing after 1996. In addition, data for Tibet became available
after 1986. Other provinces have full data from 1980 to 2007 for all the variables.

7. Statistical Result

Table 2 presents the result of the OLS estimation in column 1. It shows that the share of
youth has a positive effect on private saving rate with the control of per capita income, GDP
growth rate, the share of labor force enrolled in social security, and year and province fixed
effect. This coefficient is not statistically significant even at the 10% confidence level. In
addition, it is not economically significant either. A one standard deviation increase of share of
youth leads to only a 0.2 percentage point increase of the savings rate. This result is possibly
biased due to the endogeneity as explained in the previous section. Thus, I perform two 2SLS
estimations to correct for potential endogeneity and to better examine the direct influence of the
OCP on the saving rate. The second column of table 2 is the IV estimation with only the fine as
the instrument. With the same control in the OLS regression, the first IV estimation predicts a
negative relation between share of youth and household saving rate. It is statistically significant
at a 10% confidence level. One standard deviation increase of the share of youth decreases 11

Cao 16

percentage points of the saving rate. However, the fine alone is not a strong instrument. The
critical value of F-statistic in the first stage regression is only 4.1. Similarly, the third column of
table 2 is the IV estimation with only the share of minority as the instrument. It makes a stronger
estimation compare to using fine as instrument. The first stage F-statistic is 25.5. The second IV
estimation also predicts a statistically significant negative correlation between the fertility
decision and saving behavior. It indicates that one standard deviation increase of the share of
youth decreases 3.6 percentage points of the saving rate. Moreover, the third IV estimation with
instruments of both the share of minority and the fine is presented in the forth column of table 2.
As expected, it indicates a negative correlation between the share of youth and the private saving
rate as expected. It is statistically significant at a 1% confidence level. It predicts that one
standard deviation increase of the share of youth decreases 4.7 percentage points of the saving
rate. This regression estimates that the income level and the GDP growth positively relate to the
household saving rate. It also indicates that increase share of population enrolled in the social
security plan decreases the household saving rate.
From 1980 to 2007 in China, the average share of population under 20 across provinces
decrease by 4 percent, and the average household saving increased by 13 percent. The third IV
estimation, using both fine and share of minority as instruments, predicts that a 4 percentage
point decrease of share of population under 20 will lead to increase the household saving rate by
5.5 percent. According to this regression, the implementation of the OCP can account for 40
percent of the observed increase in Chinese household saving rate from 1980 to 2007.
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8. Robustness Check: Micro Level Evidence

In order to test whether the influence of the OCP on saving rate is consistent at the micro
level, I perform an OLS regression of number of children on household saving rate using a
household survey data. I use the cross section data from the Chinese Household Income Project
2008-2009. Considering households with multiple generations living together can have a
potential difference in saving behaviors, following Curtis etc. (2015), I limit the data to only
nuclear families that contain the household head, his or her spouse and their biological or in-law
children. Moreover, the saving behavior can be inherently different for people in different stages
of the life cycle. Thus, I restrict the data to the household head that is no older than 65 years old.
This data contains 2,495 observations. For each household, I match the data of the children to the
household head to generate the number of children that each household has. I calculate the
saving rate by taking the ratio of the difference of the household annual-income and expenditure
to their annual income. The household annual income and expenditure are sum of these of all the
working people in the household. The summary statistics of the household head of a nuclear
family is in table 3. Furthermore, I create a restricted data for households that have children at
home that are younger than 22 years old, which is the age of college graduation and is also the
common age for children become financially independent. I suspect that the saving behavior for
households with older children staying with parents to be different from the one with younger
children. Thus, I will perform an additional regression to examine the impact of the number of
children on saving rate with a separate restricted household data. The restricted data contains
2,216 households~ the summary statistics are shown in table 4.
I perform an OLS regression of household saving rate on the number of children with the
control of the age of the household head, annual income, and dummy variable of the pension
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status and educational background. Table 5 shows the result of the OLS regressions of
unrestricted and restricted data. The second column is the regression using the restricted data
with the control of natural log of income instead of income from one to the third power. It
predicts that increase of the number of children by one unit decreases the household saving rate
by I I -percentage points. It is statistically significant at a 99-percentage confidence level. All the
other regressions also indicate similar results. Banerjee etc. (2013), using the first-born child
after 1972 as an instrument for the number of children, also found that one additional child
decrease saving rate by I I -percentage points. While these regressions do not imply causation,
the result confirms the hypothesis of the negative relation between number of children and
saving rate and support the result at the provincial level.

9. Conclusion

In this paper, I find that the high level of Chinese household saving rate can be explained
by the change of demographic structure that is influenced by family planning policy, such as the
OCP. The OCP, working as a natural experiment, exogenously decreased the share of youth in
the population. With the reduced total expenditure on rearing children and diminished potential
over-generation transfer payment, the decreased share of youth in China led to the increasing
saving rate. The use of financial punishment and share of minority as instrument for the share of
population under 20 years old in each province help to control for endogeneity and give an
unbiased estimation of the effect of the change in family size. The result from the 2SLS
estimations using provincial aggregated data and the OLS estimation with the household survey
data are both consistent with the hypothesis that decreasing share of youth leads to increase in
the private saving rate.
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The practice of family planning policy, the OCP, limited the share of youth in China, and
resulted in a high state of the household saving rate. In the same logic, the recent relaxation of
the One-Child Policy is expected to have a negative effect on the saving rate in the long run. If
the Two-Child Policy stimulated fertility and led to an increase in the share of youth, the saving
rate in China is expected to decrease in the future. Consequently, both Chinese domestic
investment and consumption and global trade balance will be influenced. However, with the
economics development and the openness to western culture, people's belief regarding fertility
decision is also changing in China. Like the situation in the U.S. and many European countries,
as the Chinese economy becomes more developed, people may prefer not to have more children
for support in their elder years.
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Appendix A

Chart 1: Chinese Average Provincial Household Saving Rate (1980-2007)
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Chart 2: Chinese Average Provincial Share of Population under 20 (1980-2007)
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Provincial Data4

Obs

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

Saving Rate

843

0.185

0.073

-0.092

0.394

Share ofunder20

843

0.350

0.034

0.212

0.425

Share of minority

843

0.153

0.211

0.002

0.984

Fine

843

0.684

0.818

0.000

5.000

Ln(income)

843

7.295

1.086

5.181

9.906

GDPgrowth

843

0.163

0.076

-0.047

0.534

Share of enrolled
in social security

843

0.080

0.160

0.000

0.970

Non-zero fine

461

1.250

0.717

0.200

5.000

Variable

4

I create a variable "non-zero fine" which eliminates all the observations without implementation of fine to better
show the magnitude of the financial punishment for violating the OCP.

Cao 23

Table 2: Share of population under 20m on private saving rate

Household Saving Rate
OLS

IV (I)

IV (II)

IV (III)

0.053
(0.062)

-3.245*
(1.826)

-1.05***
(0.401)

-1.382***
(0.402)

0.1935***
(0.014)

-0.011
(0.117)

0.126***
(0.029)

0.105***
(0.030)

GDP Growth

0.041
(0.028)

0.063
(0.058)

0.048*
(0.032)

0.051
(0.035)

Share Enrolled in
Social Security

-0.019
(0.018)

-0.0449*
(0.240)

-0.167***
(0.056)

-0.206***
(0.056)

Share of under 20

Ln(income)

Ri

0.787

First Stage
-0.003**
(0.002)

Fine

0.131 ***
(0.026)

0.133***
(0.0259)

3.896

25.518

15.279

Share of Minority
F-statistic

-0.004**
(0.002)

Year dummy

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Province dummy

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

843

843

843

843

Observations

(Standard Error in parenthesis)
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Table 3. Summary Statistics for Household Survey Data

Obs

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

Saving Rate

2495

0.344

0.329

-0.986

0.955

N child

2495

0.913

0.467

0

4

Age

2495

43.32

8.350

23

65

Annual income

2495

58435

50619

4800

1140000

Pension

2495

0.808

0.394

0

1

Edu

2495

5.777

1.560

1

9

Variable

Table 4. Summary Statistics for Restricted Household Survey Data

Obs

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

Saving Rate

2216

0.343

0.323

-0.986

0.961

N child

2216

0.878

0.478

0

4

Age

2216

41.42

7.640

23

64

Annual income

2216

59123

56660

4800

122400

Pension

2216

0.819

0.385

0

1

Edu

2216

5.936

1.563

1

9

Variable
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Table 5. Impact of Number of Children on Saving: Micro Data Result
Variables
#Children

Age

Age 2

Pension

Restricted I

Restricted II

Unrestricted I

Unrestricted II

-0.11 ***

-0.122***

-0.081 ***

-0.095***

(0.013)

(0.013)

(0.012)

(0.012)

0.04***

0.038***

0.022***

0.0239***

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.006)

(0.006)

-0.0005***

0.0004***

-0.0003***

-0.0003***

(0.00009)

(0.00008)

(0.00007)

(0.00007)

-0.015

-0.016

-0.0009

-0.002

(0.015)

(0.014)

(0.014)

(0.013)

ln(income)

0.291 ***

0.307***

(0.009)

(0.009)

Additional Controls:
Income

Yes

No

Yes

No

Income2

Yes

No

Yes

No

Income 3

Yes

No

Yes

No

Edu Dummy

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

2216

2216

3018

3018

Adjusted R2

0.3333

0.3922

0.3233

0.3824
(Standard Error in parenthesis)
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AppendixB
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